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Pursuant

to Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure, Petitioner Hercules Incorporated

("Hercules") hereby

submits this Reply Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Statement of the Case contained in Hercules' initial brief
and in Salt Lake County's
accurate.

(the "County") brief is reasonably

However, Hercules believes the County's purported

clarification of Hercules' Statement of Facts needs correction.
CORRECTION OF THE COUNTY'S CLARIFICATION
OF HERCULES' STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Paragraph 1 of the County's clarification of Hercules'

Statement of Facts states: "The County would note that the Bacchus
works is responsible for 83% of the business of the Aerospace
group."

County brief at p. 5.

misleading.

This assertion is inaccurate and

The Bacchus Works constitutes 83% of the physical

assets of the Aerospace group, not 83% of the business of the
Aerospace group.

Transcript, ("Tr.") pp. 98-99.

The record does

not indicate what portion of the Bacchus Works assets are located
in Davis County at Hercules' Clearfield, Utah facility, or what
portion of the Bacchus works is located in Tooele County at
Hercules' Tekoi Test Range.1

Furthermore, the 83% of physical

assets number does not show, in any way, the Bacchus Works'

1
Hercules' Bacchus Works consists of Bacchus West, Plant 1, NIROP and
Plant 3 all located in Salt Lake County, and Plant 2 located in Davis County at
Clearfield, Utah as well as Tekoi Test Range which is in Tooele County.
Tr. pp. 159-160.
96375

relative

contribution

to earnings of the Aerospace Group as

compared to those Hercules' Aerospace facilities which are located
in other states, or counties in Utah other than Salt Lake County.
2.

In paragraph 3 of the County's Clarification of Hercules'

Statement of Facts the County states:

"However, the testimony of

David R. Peirson, Hercules' manager of state and local taxes,
indicated that, as of the lien date, prospects for business growth
were good."

County brief at p. 6.

The transcript citation,

Tr. 108-09, which the County relies upon to support this assertion
shows only that Hercules' prospects for production of the Titan
rocket motor may have been good as of January 1, 1990. The record
does not support any assertion, or implication, for production at
the Bacchus works of other rocket motors.
production may have

Thus, although Titan

"looked pretty good," other rocket motor

production at the Bacchus works didn't look very good at all.
3.

In paragraph 4 of the County's Clarification of Hercules'

Statement of Facts, the County states:
however,

Mr. Peirson

recoverable."

96375

acknowledged

County brief at p. 7.

2

that

"On cross-examination,
the

loss

might

be

This is misleading because

Mr. Peirson later testified that "Hercules never did recover these
losses."

Tr. pp. 162-63.2
POINT I
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN REQUIRING HERCULES TO
REBUT THE APPRAISED VALUE ASSIGNED BY EDDIE
KENT.

The

County

asserts

that

the

Commission

was

correct

in

requiring Hercules to prove that Mr. Kent's appraised value of $183
million was not the proper assessed value.

The County states:

After Hercules called the value of its
property
for
assessment
purposes
into
question, the County reevaluated its use of
this historical method, determining it to be
incorrect and modified its original value,
which resulted in a decrease of approximately
$28 million.
...
Far from being discarded as an "unofficial
assessment", the County's assessment, modified
to take depreciation into consideration
(including an economic obsolescence factor),
is entitled to a presumption of correctness,
the taxpayer (Hercules) having failed to
provide a sound evidentiary basis to support
its assertion of a lower valuation. County
brief at pp. 11 & 12.
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Q:

What about the losses in the annual report listed for 1989,
have they been recovered?

A:

No they have not.

Q:

What happened?

A:

They haven't been recovered.
The contracts haven't been
completed, the Titan test firing was a failure. Even if we
complete the Titan contract, even if we complete this test
firing, the next firing of the Titan motor, we have four more
to test successfully.

3

As

pointed

out

appraisal was not

in

Hercules'

the County's

initial

brief,

Mr. Kent's

official assessment

which is

entitled to any presumption of correctness, Mr. Kent's appraisal
was not incorporated into the County Assessment book for delivery
to the County Auditor by the County Assessor, under affidavit. See
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-311.

The County Auditor did not transmit

this $183 million proposed value on the assessment books to the
Commission.

See Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-322.

In other words,

Mr. Kent's appraised value had no presumptive validity.
Furthermore, this appraised value was arrived at only in
preparation for the hearing before the Utah State Tax Commission.
Mr. Kent's appraisal was not even completed until September 10,
1991, more than nine (9) months after Hercules had already paid its
taxes to the County based upon an assessed value of approximately
$211 million.3

Record, Exhibit R-4.

The original $211 million assessment was the value the County
asserted in the hearing before the Board of Equalization, Record
Exhibit P-31, and was also asserted throughout all proceedings
before the Utah State Tax Commission.

This can be seen by

examining the Motion for Directed Verdict brought by the County's
attorney following the close of Hercules' case at the Commission
hearing, Tr. pp. 690-700; and

by

3

reviewing

the

post-hearing

Taxes were due and paid by Hercules to Salt Lake County on
November 30, 1990 for the lien date of January 1, 1990. See Utah Code Ann. §592-1331.
96375
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memorandum filed by the County with the Commission; Record pp. 68113.
Mr. Kent's appraisal is not an "adjustment," as urged by the
County.

It was an entirely new value prepared using a different

appraisal methodology, solely for the Commission hearing, and was
clear evidence that the County could not sustain a fair market
value

of

$211 million

as

it asserted

before

the

Board of

Equalization. Mr. Kent's appraisal opinion of a $183 million value
is not entitled to any presumption and the Commission erred when it
required Hercules to demonstrate that this value was improper. In
this proceeding the burden of proof was not Hercules1 .

Once the

Commission rejected the County's assessment of approximately $211
million, both parties bore an equal burden and that party which
established value by a preponderance of the evidence should have
prevailed.

That party was Hercules.
POINT II

THE COMMISSION ERRED BY FAILING TO PROPERLY
ACCOUNT FOR THE ECONOMIC AND FUNCTIONAL
OBSOLESCENCE OF HERCULES' FACILITIES.
A.

Economic Obsolescence.
Mr. Kent assigned a 10% economic obsolescence

Hercules' facilities.

factor to

As pointed out in Hercules' initial brief,

Mr. Shoup aggregated economic obsolescence, functional obsolescence
and physical deterioration in order to arrive at an accumulated
depreciation
96375

figure for Hercules' facilities.
5

Hercules then

confirmed Mr. Shoup's assignment of accumulated depreciation by
performing

two

utilization

studies

showing

that

Hercules'

facilities were significantly under-employed as of January 1, 1990.
See report by Richard Cloward, Record, Exhibit P-19, and report by
Dr. Crawford,

Record,

Exhibit P-28.

Hercules

also presented

substantial evidence to indicate why it suffered such massive and
significant economic obsolescence.
Mr. Kent could not articulate any qualitative or quantitative
analysis as to how he assigned his 10% economic obsolescence
factor.

His testimony was that the 10% figure was based upon

"appraisal judgment."

Tr. p. 1002.

In other words, Mr. Kent's

assignment was completely arbitrary.
Even though both parties identified the same external factors
which caused Hercules' property to suffer from economic obsolescence,

i.e.

treaties,

reduction

and

cancellation

of missile

contracts, the space shuttle disaster, the fall of the Berlin Wall,
general peace efforts, etc., Mr. Kent gave no evidence, and could
not articulate the way in which he determined that a 10% economic
obsolescence factor should be applied to Hercules' facilities. Tr.
p. 985.
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His

determination

was

6

based

solely

upon

appraisal

Tr. p. 868, 985 and 1002.4

judgment.

The record shows that

Mr. Kent has no experience in valuing the kind of industrial
facility represented by Hercules' Bacchus works, i.e. in excess of
2 million square feet.
Hercules, in contrast, identified the factors which caused
economic obsolescence, and then measured those factors by comparing
the capacity of Hercules' Bacchus works with the actual utilization
(production) accomplished at the Bacchus Works.

This showed that

the Bacchus Works was significantly and substantially underTr. 868
Q:

However, you did allocate a certain portion for external
obsolescence; is that correct?

A:

Yes. I was looking to the future and trying to determine the
impact of ongoing peace negotiations and things of that nature
as affecting Hercules' business. In my judgment, 10 percent
is the allowable amount. It may be overstated.

Tr. 985
Q:

What empirical evidence is contained in your appraisal to
justify your assignment of 10 percent external obsolescence to
the Bacchus Works?

A:

My appraisal does not contain any, either.

Tr. 1002
Mr. WILLES: One of the issues I think that is going to be
most significant in his hearing is going to be the economic
obsolescence issue. I wanted to understand clearly in my mind
your selection of 10 -percent and have you give --or give you
a chance to explain your understanding of where the 10 percent
came from in this as opposed to five percent or 15 percent or
some other number in there. Was there some market research
method of arriving at that percentage number or how did you
arrive at that 10 percent?
THE WITNESS: It was my opinion. It was my appraisal judgment
and opinion that I concluded 10 percent. As I stated earlier,
I may have, based on the information that I reviewed,
overstated the external obsolescence.
96375
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utilized, and that the reason for this under-employment was that
Hercules had no market for the products these facilities were
designed to produce, i.e. rocket motors.

Thus, the Commission's

adoption of Mr. Kent's appraised value, as opposed to Hercules',
was an arbitrary action because Mr. Kent's economic obsolescence
assignment

was

wholly

arbitrary.

Utah

Code

Ann. § 63-46b-

16(4)(h)(iv) (1993) mandates that Hercules be granted relief when
the Commission's action is "otherwise arbitrary or capricious."
See also Adams v. Bd. of Rev, of Ind. Comm. . 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Ut.
App. 1991).
The County tries to demonstrate that economic obsolescence
should not be applied to the Bacchus Works because;
"Hercules '10k' report as of December 31, 1989
shows a backlog of orders for Hercules
aerospace of approximately
$2.4 billion
compared with $2.2 billion on December 31,
1988.
Bacchus Works represents 83% of
Hercules' aerospace assets."
County brief,
p. 22.
What the County fails to point out is that there is no showing
this backlog is for production which could be accomplished at the
Bacchus Works. Hercules has 11 aerospace facilities. The Bacchus
Works is one of those 11 plants.

Mr. Peirson testified that the

Bacchus Works is devoted to the production of strategic missiles,
not tactical rocket motors.
business was declining.

Tr. p. 99.

The strategic missile

Tr. pp. 101-103.

The Bacchus Works

suffered a $343 million loss in 1989, whereas Hercules' aerospace
96375
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in the aggregate suffered a $243 million loss. Record, Exhibit P18c, and Tr. pp. 111-113. This shows that Hercules' Bacchus Works
was highly unprofitable whereas the other Hercules' aerospace
facilities were, in fact, generating a net profit.

Thus, the

Bacchus Works continued to lose money whereas other Hercules'
aerospace facilities were profitably

employed.

The County's

attempt to show that no economic obsolescence should apply to the
Bacchus Works due to a "backlog of orders," is improper, as that
backlog of orders was applicable to other Hercules facilities but
not to the Bacchus Works.
B.

Functional Obsolescence.
Mr. Kent also assigned a 5% functional obsolescence to the

facilities at NIROP and Plant 1.

This 5% factor is another

completely arbitrary action. The reason Mr. Kent gave for this 5%
factor was that 5% of the building values were based upon Hercules'
cost of construction, as opposed to replacement cost arrived at
through application of the Marshall Valuation Service.
pp. 861-62.

Tr.

This has nothing to do with whether or not these

facilities were functionally obsolescent.
As shown in Hercules' initial brief, functional obsolescence
which should be applied

to Plant 1 and NIROP can easily be

demonstrated by comparing the capacity of Plant 1 to Bacchus West.
Plant 1 has twice the building space as Bacchus West, yet it only
has production capacity of 300,000 pounds of propellant per month
96375
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as compared to 2,000,000 pounds per month capacity at Bacchus West,
i.e. 15% of the capacity of Bacchus West. Moreover, there are 348
buildings in Plant 1 and 51 buildings in Bacchus West. Obviously,
Plant 1 is an outdated, technologically obsolete facility suffering
from significant functional disutility.

Mr. Kent's assignment of

a 5% functional obsolescence to Plant 1 because 5% of the buildings
of the plant were valued based upon Hercules' cost is completely
arbitrary, and bears no relationship to reality.

This further

evidences the error of the Commission's decision in adopting
Mr. Kent's assignment of functional obsolescence as opposed to
Hercules' proposed value for accumulated depreciation.
The County also asserts that Mr. Shoup double counted the
value

of Hercules' property by

personal property.

classifying

some property as

This is simply not true.

As is clearly

demonstrated in the record, Hercules asserted in the hearing that
one of the major differences between the replacement cost new
Mr. Kent assigned to Hercules' facilities, and the replacement cost
new assigned by Mr. Shoup to Hercules' facilities was because
Mr. Shoup classified a significant portion of Hercules facilities
as personal property which Mr. Kent included as real property.
Simply stated this means that if Mr. Shoup were to include in
his appraisal the personal property he did not initially appraise,
i.e. all the facilities that Mr. Kent classified as real property,
then the replacement cost difference is insignificant, less than

10%.

The real difference between the parties in this case is the

amount of accumulated depreciation assigned, including functional
and economic obsolescence for Hercules, which should be deducted
from the property's replacement cost to arrive at fair market
value. Mr. Shoup and Hercules assigned accumulated depreciation of
89% for Plant 1, 78% for NIROP, 56% for Plant 3 and 44% for Bacchus
West. Mr. Kent and the County assigned accumulated depreciation of
30.8% for Plant 1, 31.8% for NIROP, 17.8% for Plant 3, and 17.7%
for Bacchus West. Mr. Kent's assignment was arbitrary because he
could not identify any reasonable basis for his depreciation
numbers.
CONCLUSION
As stated in Hercules' initial brief, the Court should reverse
the Commission and

remand this case for further proceedings

requiring the Commission to apply the proper burden of proof.
DATED this /£*&• day of February, 1994.

<*&-*Lz&6?L
KtflTH E. TAYLOR
KENT W. WINTERHOLLER
RICHARD M. MARSH
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 72 Am. Jur. 2d State and
Local Taxation § 788 et seq.
Key Numbers. — Taxation •=» 334.

59-2-310. Assessment in name of claimant as well as
owner.
Real property described on the assessment book need not be described a
second time, but any person claiming the real property and a desire to be
assessed for the land may have the person's name inserted with that of the
person to whom the real property is assessed.
History: C. 1953, 59-2-310, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 4, § 78.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 72 Am. Jur. 2d State and
Local Taxation § 740 et seq.

C.J.S. — 84 CJ.S. Taxation § 408.
Key Numbers. — Taxation «= 337 et seq.

59-2-311. Completion and delivery of assessment book —
Affidavit required — Contents of affidavit.
Prior to May 22 each year, the assessor shall complete and deliver the
assessment book to the county auditor. The assessor shall subscribe an affidavit in the assessment book substantially as follows:
I,
, the assessor of
County, do swear
that before May 22, 19 , I made diligent inquiry and examination, and
either personally or by deputy, established the value of all of the property
within the county subject to assessment by me; that the property has been
assessed on the assessment book equally and uniformly according to the
best of my judgment, information, and belief at its fair market value; that
I have faithfully complied with all the duties imposed on the assessor
under the revenue laws; and that I have not imposed any unjust or double
assessments through malice or ill will or otherwise, or allowed anyone to
escape a just and equal assessment through favor or reward, or otherwise.
History: C. 1953, 59-2-311, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 4, § 79; 1988, ch. 3, § 98; 1988, ch.
169, § 30.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment by ch. 3, effective February 9, 1988, in
^S?"
*¥£* afBd*v*' substituted "May 22"
for May 15 and substituted at its fair market value" for "at 75% of its fair market value
J oxenoinor
J *• i
-L
under Section 59-2-103 for residential property
andatlOO%ofitsfairmarketvalue underSection 59-2-103 for all other property."

The 1988 amendment by ch. 169, effective
April 25, 1988, substituted "May 22" for "May
15" near the beginning of the form of the affidavit and made other minor stylistic changes,
This section is set out as reconciled by the
office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel
w«*-Jo^^^*;„« rfc~A„«*j™
T
moo
Ketrospective Operation. — Laws 1988,
* Q c 0™
., ^, . .,
,,
,
" h 3 ' § e269
Proy,des that the act has retrospectlve
ratlon
°P
*> January L 1988.
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59-2-321. Extension of taxes on assessment book.
The general taxes of each city, town, school, and special taxing district shall
be extended on the assessment book by the county auditor at the rate certified
by the governing body of the city, town, school, and special taxing district at
the time the state and county taxes are extended, and the whole tax shall be
carried into a column of aggregates, and shall be collected by the county
treasurer at the time and in the manner provided by law for collecting state
and county taxes.
History: R.S. 1898, § 2691; L. 1903, ch. § 44; C. 1953, 59-8-2; renumbered by L.
132, § 1; C.L. 1907, § 2691; C.L. 1917, § 6105; 1987, ch. 4, § 147.
R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 80-8-2; L. 1982, ch. 71,

59-2-322. Transmittal of statement to commission.
The county auditor shall, before June 8 of each year, prepare from the
assessment book of that year a statement showing in separate columns:
(1) the total value of all property;
(2) the value of real estate, including patented mining claims, stated
separately;
(3) the value of the improvements;
(4) the value of personal property exclusive of money; and
(5) the number of acres of land and the number of patented mining
claims, stated separately.
As soon as the statement is prepared the county auditor shall transmit the
statement by mail to the commission.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §§ 2600, 71, § 45; C. 1953, 59-8-3; renumbered by L.
2601; C.L. 1917, §§ 6000,6001; R.S. 1933 & C. 1987, ch. 4, § 148; 1987, ch. 148, § 2.
1943, 80-8-3; L. 1981, ch. 241, § 9; 1982, ch.

59-2-323. Changes ordered by commission.
(1) The commission shall,, before June 17 or within ten days after the
county auditors of the state have filed their report with the commission as
provided for under Section 59-2-322, each year transmit to the county auditor
a statement of the changes made by it in the assessment book of the county, as
provided under Section 59-1-210.
(2) As soon as the county auditor receives from the commission a statement
of the changes made by it in the assessment book of the county, or of any
assessment contained therein, the auditor shall make the corresponding
changes in the assessment book, by entering the same in a column provided
with the proper heading in the assessment book, counting any fractional sum
when more than 50 cents as one dollar and omitting it when less than 50
cents, so that the value of any separate assessment shall contain no fractions
of a dollar; but shall in all cases disregard any action of the county board of
equalization or commission which is prohibited by law.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2602; § 46; C. 1953, 59-8-4; renumbered by L.
C.L. 1917, § 6002; R.S. 1933, 80-8-4; L. 1941, 1987, ch. 4, § 149; 1987, ch. 148, § 3.
ch. 82, § 1; C. 1943, 80-8-4; L. 1982, ch. 71,

84

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Partial payment of tax.
While no taxpayer may compel county treasurer to accept less than the whole tax levied
against a separate parcel of property, except as
provided by this section, yet county treasurer
may in his discretion accept part payment and
credit same upon tax assessed and, when that
is done, if any part of the tax remains unpaid

on delinquent date, treasurer must proceed, as
provided by law, to sell property for such
unpaid tax, and penalty must be computed
upon amount of tax remaining unpaid and delinquent, and interest after sale must be cornputed upon amount for which property was
sold. State ex rel. State Tax ComnYn v. Evans,
79 Utah 370, 6 P.2d 161, 84 A.L.R. 766 (1932).

59-2-1331. Date tax is delinquent — Penalty — Interest —
Payments.
(1) All taxes, unless otherwise specifically provided for under Section
59-2-1332, or other law, unpaid or postmarked after November 30 of each year
following the date of levy, are delinquent, and the county treasurer shall close
the treasurer's office for the posting of current year tax payments until a
delinquent list has been prepared.
(2) All delinquent taxes are subject to a penalty of 2% of the amount of the
taxes or $10, whichever is greater. Unless the delinquent taxes, together with
the penalty, are paid before January 16, the amount of taxes and penalty shall
bear interest on a per annum basis from January 1 following the delinquency
date. This interest rate is 600 basis points (6%) above the "Federal Discount
Rate" that exists on January 1 following the date of delinquency.
(3) If the delinquency exceeds one year, the amount of taxes and penalty for
that year and all succeeding years shall bear interest until settled in full
through redemption or final tax sale. The interest rate to be applied shall be
calculated for each year as established under Subsection (2) and shall apply on
each individual year's delinquency until paid.
(4) The county treasurer may accept and credit on account against taxes
becoming due during the current year, at any time before or after the levies
are made, but not subsequent to the date of delinquency, either:
(a) payments in amounts of not less than $10; or
(b) the full amount of the unpaid tax.
History: C. 1953, 59-2-1331, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 3, § 188; 1991, ch. 40, § 1.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1988,
ch. 3, § 188 repeals former § 59-2-1331, as
amended by L. 1987, ch. 4, § 209, relating to
sale of undivided interests in land, and enacts
the present section, effective February 9, 1988.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted "or
postmarked after" for "at noon on" and "post-

ing of current year tax payments" for "receipt
of taxes" in Subsection (1); in Subsection (2),
substituted "or $10 whichever is greater" for
"with a minimum penalty of $10" in the first
sentence and substituted "January 16" for
"January 15" in the second sentence; and made
changes in punctuation in Subsection (4).
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1988,
ch. 3, § 269 provides that the act has retrospective operation to January 1, 1988.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
N

Am. Jur. 2d. — 72 Am. Jur. 2d State and
Local Taxation §§ 842, 856 to 865.

177

C.J.S. — 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 617.
Key Numbers. — Taxation *=» 526 et seq.

(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of
fact and law and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings,
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this
section.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-15, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25; 1990,
ch. 132, § 1.

Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23,1990, added the exception at the end of Subsection (l)(a).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Final agency action.
Function of district court.
Right to judicial proceeding.
Cited,
Final agency action.
Industrial Commission's determination of
wrongful discharge was not final, and so not
reviewable under this section, because the
commission and the parties had not resolved
the issue of reimbursement for lost wages and
benefits as required by § 34-28-19(2). Parkdale
Care Ctr. v. Frandsen, 837 P.2d 989 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).
_
r
Function o f . d e t e c t court
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final
agency decisions through formal adjudicative
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore,
the district court will no longer function as intermediate appellate court except to review informal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursu-

ant to Subsection (l)(a) of this section. In re
Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert.
denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).
The only appellate jurisdiction statutorily
delegated to the district court is to review informal agency adjudicative proceedings. State
]$"*»'• 7 9 4 R 2 d 4 9 6 ( U t a h C t A p p "
Right to judicial proceeding.
District court erred in declining a de novo
review of a dentist's claim to licensure by reciprocity, where there had been no proceeding on
his application that was sufficiently judicial in
nature, and he had not yet had the licensing
agency's action reviewed in a "trial-type hearing." Kirk v. Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing, 815 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct.
A

iggi)

Cited in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance
v. Board of State Lands & Forestry, 830 P.2d
233 (Utah 1992); Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 52 (Ct.
App. 1993).

63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
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(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
«
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
History: C. 1953,63-46b-16, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26.
Cross-References. — Review of proceed-

ings before State Tax Commission, jurisdiction
and standard, §§ 59-1-601, 59-1-610.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Agency action.
Applicability of section.
Arbitrary action.
Conflicting evidence.
Factual findings.
Final order.
Function of district court.
Jurisdictional hearing by board.
Prior practice.
Review.
Standard of review.
—Interpretation of statutory term.
—Questions of law.
Substantial evidence test.
Substantial prejudice.
Whole record test.
Cited.
Agency action.
Whether the Industrial Commission acted
contrary to its own rule is governed by Subsection (4)(h)(ii) of this section. Ashcroft v. Indus-

trial Comrn'n, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).
Applicability of section.
Subsection (4) deals with judicial relief, not
judicial review. It does not affect the degree of
deference an appellate court grants to an
agency's decision. Rather, it ensures that relief
should not be granted when, although the
agency committed error, the error was harmless. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah State Tax
Comrn'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).
Arbitrary action.
Industrial commission's denial of occupational disease disability benefits based upon a
solitary finding regarding the ultimate issue of
causation failed to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions
of mixed fact and law, were reached, and therefore rendered the action arbitrary. Adams v.
Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
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Conflicting evidence.
In undertaking a review, the appellate court
will not substitute its judgment as between two
reasonably conflicting views, even though the
court might have come to a different conclusion
had the case come before it for de novo review.
It is the province of the board, not appellate
courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and
where inconsistent inferences can be drawn
from the same evidence, it is for the board to
draw the inferences. Grace Drilling Co. v.
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
Appellate court refers to the assessment by
the Board of Review of the Utah Industrial
Commission on conflicting evidence. Albertsons, Inc. v. Department of Emp. Sec., 854 P.2d
570 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Factual findings.
Under Subsection (4)(d), the appellate court
will not disturb the board's application of its
factual findings to the law unless its determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness
and rationality. Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v.
Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439 (Utah Ct. App.
1989); Nelson v. Dep't of Emp. Sec., 801 P.2d
158 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Final order.
Administrative law judge's denial of motions
to dismiss petitions of the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing allowed the
proceeding to continue in the agency and was
not a final order for purposes of judicial review.
Barney v. Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, 828 P.2d 542 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992).
Nonfinal agency orders do not divest the
agency of jurisdiction. Maverik Country
Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 221 Utah
Adv. Rep. 17 (Ct. App. 1993).
Function of district court
Subsection (1) provides that all final agency
decisions through formal adjudicative proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme
Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, the district court will no longer function as intermediate appellate court except to review informal
adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to
§ 63-46b-15(l)(a). In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45
(Utah 1989).
Jurisdictional hearing by board.
The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over
appeal from jurisdictional hearing conducted
by a hearing officer appointed by the Career
Service Review Board since the hearing was a
formal adjudicative proceeding. Lopez v. Career Serv. Review Bd., 834 P.2d 568 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).

Prior practice.
Ten agency decisions in which pharmacists
committed equal or allegedly more significant
violations of the law, but received substantially lighter penalties than petitioner received, raised a question about the consistency
of his penalty with prior agency practice.
Pickett v. Utah Dep't of Commerce, 218 Utah
Adv. Rep. 51 (Ct. App. 1993).
Review.
Because POST (Division of Peace Officer
Standards and Training) did not conduct any
formal proceedings, and petitioner's filing of a
"complaint" with POST about an officer did not
require it to do so, the appellate court did not
have jurisdiction to review POSTs decision not
to pursue decertification of POST officer. Nielson v. Division of Peace Officer Stds. & Training, 851 P.2d 1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Standard of review.
Under Subsection (4)(d), it is appropriate for
a court to review an agency's interpretation of
its statutorily granted powers and authority as
a question of law, with no deference to the
agency's view of the law. The correction-oferror standard will be applied to such an issue
and the agency's statutory interpretation will
be upheld only if it is concluded to be not erroneous. Bevans v. Industrial Comm'n, 790 P.2d
573 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Under Subsection (4)(d), a court may grant
relief based upon an agency's erroneous interpretation of law. This incorporates the correction-of-error standard previously applied by
the Utah courts in cases involving agency interpretations of law. Savage Indus., Inc. v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah
1991).
The legislature in enacting Subsection (4) intended that the same standard used for determining the harmfulness of error in appeals
from judicial proceedings should apply to reviews of agency actions. Under this standard,
an error will be harmless if it is sufficiently
inconsequential that there is no reasonable
likelihood that the error affected the outcome
of the proceedings. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).
Absent a grant of discretion, a correction-oferror standard is used in reviewing an agency's
interpretation or application of a statutory
term. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991); Mor-Flo
Indus., Inc. v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d
516 (Utah 1992).
An agency's statutory construction should
only be given deference when there is a grant
of discretion to the agency concerning the language in question, either expressly made in the
statute or implied from the statutory language.
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n,
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814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991); Uintah Oil Ass'n v.
County Bd. of Equalization, 853 P.2d 894
(Utah 1993).
Constitutional questions are characterized
as questions of law, and under Subsection
(4)(d), agency determinations of general law —
which include interpretations of the state and
federal constitutions — are to be reviewed under a correction-of-error standard, giving no
deference to the agency's decision. Questar
Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 817
P.2d 316 (Utah 1991).
Under Subsection (4)(a), the Court of Appeals reviews the constitutionality of the statute upon which an agency's action is based
without deference, as a conclusion of law.
Velarde v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 123
(Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Because courts should uphold agency rules if
they are reasonable and rational, courts should
also uphold reasonable and rational departures
from those rules by the agency absent a showing that the departure violated some other
right. Union Pac. R.R. v. Auditing Div., 842
P.2d 876 (Utah 1992).
Deference is given to an agency's statutory
construction only when there is a grant of discretion to the agency concerning the language
in question, either expressly made in the statute or implied from the statutory language.
Absent a grant of discretion, a correction-oferror standard is used in reviewing an agency's
interpretation or application of a statutory
term. Horton v. Utah State Retirement Bd.,
842 P.2d 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Since § 35-4-5(b)(l) provides that a claimant
is ineligible for unemployment benefits if the
individual is "discharged for just cause . . . if
so found by the commission," the appellate
court reviews the action of the Board of Review
of the Utah Industrial Commission under Subsection (4)(h)(i) of this section for reasonableness. Albertsons, Inc. v. Department of Emp.
Sec., 854 P.2d 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
—Interpretation of statutory term.
Absent a grant of discretion, a correction-oferror standard is used in reviewing an agency's
interpretation or application of a statutory
term such as "injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease" in § 35-2-105. However,
when the legislature either expressly or implicitly grants the agency discretion to interpret or apply a statutory term, a court will review the agency's interpretation or application
under a reasonableness standard. Luckau v.
Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 840 P.2d
811 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
—Questions of law.
Intermediate deference should be granted to
an agency's interpretation or application of
specific laws when the legislature has explicitly or implicitly delegated discretion to the

agency to interpret or apply that law. If there
is no explicit delegation of discretion, and the
issues are questions of constitutional law and
statutory construction on which the commission's experience and expertise will be of no
real assistance, the standard of intermediate
deference should not be applied. Zissi v. State
Tax Comm'r, 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992).
Substantial evidence test
In applying the "substantial evidence test,"
the appellate court reviews the "whole record"
before the court, and this review is distinguishable from both a de novo review and the "any
competent evidence" standard of review. Grace
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
The "substantial evidence test" of Subsection
(4)(g) grants appellate courts greater latitude
in reviewing the record than was previously
granted under the Utah Employment Security
Act's "any evidence of substance test." Grace
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
"Substantial evidence" is more than a mere
"scintilla" of evidence, though something less
than the weight of the evidence. It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Grace
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
"Substantial evidence" is that quantum and
quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to
convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion. First Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of
Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990).
The party challenging the findings must
marshal all of the evidence supporting the
findings and show that despite the supporting
facts, the agency's findings are not supported
by substantial evidence. First Nat'l Bank v.
County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163
(Utah 1990); Intermountain Health Care, Inc.
v. Board of Review, 839 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).
Substantial prejudice.
Agency decision revoking social worker's license was reversed and his case was remanded
for a new hearing, because the failure to afford
him an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him resulted in "substantial
prejudice." D.B. v. Division of Occupational &
Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d 1145 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).
The "substantial prejudice" phrase in Subsection (4) relates to the damage or harm suffered by the person seeking review and was
written to ensure that a court will not issue
advisory opinions reviewing agency action
when no true controversy has resulted from
that action. The phrase does not relate to the
degree of deference a court must give an
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agency decision. Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah
State Tax Comrn'n, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991).
Whole record test
The "whole record test" necessarily requires
that a party challenging the board's findings of
fact must marshall all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or
contradictory evidence, the findings are not
supported by substantial evidence. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).
Under the "whole record test," a court must
consider not only the evidence supporting the
board's factual findings, but also the evidence
that fairly detracts from the weight of the
board's evidence. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of
Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Cited in Law Offices of David Paul White &
Assocs. v. Board of Review, 778 P.2d 20 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989); Zimmerman v. Industrial
Comrn'n, 785 P.2d 1127 (Utah Ct. App. 1989);
Nyrehn v. Industrial Comrn'n, 800 P.2d 330
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Fred Meyer v. Industrial
Comrn'n, 800 P.2d 825 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810
P.2d 459 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); In re SAM Oil,
Inc., 817 P.2d 299 (Utah 1991); Salt Lake
County ex rel. County Bd. of Equalization v.
State Tax Comrn'n, 819 P.2d 776 (Utah 1991);

Bennion v. ANR Prod. Co., 819 P.2d 343 (Utah
1991); Johnson-Bowles Co. v. Department of
Commerce, 829 P.2d 101 (Utah Ct. App. 1991);
Department of Air Force v. Swider, 824 P.2d
448 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Board of State Lands &
Forestry, 830 P.2d 233 (Utah 1992); Ferro v.
Utah Dep't of Commerce, 828 P.2d 507 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992); MCI Telecommunications Corp.
v. Public Serv. Comrn'n, 840 P.2d 765 (Utah
1992); Cross v. Board of Review, 824 P.2d 1202
(Utah Ct. App. 1992); Giesbrecht v. Board of
Review, 828 P.2d 544 (Utah Ct. App. 1992);
Stokes v. Board of Review, 832 P.2d 56 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992); Stewart v. Board of Review,
831 P.2d 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Holland v.
State Office of Educ, 834 P.2d 596 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992); Anderson v. Public Serv. Comrn'n,
839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992); Gibson v. Department of Emp. Sec., 840 P.2d 780 (Utah Ct. App.
1992); LaSal Oil Co. v. Department of Envtl.
Quality, 843 P.2d 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1992);
King v. Industrial Comrn'n, 850 P.2d 1281
(Utah Ct. App. 1993); Board of Equalization v.
Sinclair Oil Corp., 853 P.2d 892 (Utah 1993);
Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co.
v. Tax Comrn'n, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 (Ct.
App. 1993); Thorup Bros. Constr. v. Auditing
Div. of Utah State Tax Comrn'n, 221 Utah Adv.
Rep. 39 (1993).

63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief.
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the
district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the
extent expressly authorized by statute.
(b) In granting relief, the court may:
(i) order agency action required by law;
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law;
(iii) set aside or modify agency action;
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings.
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are reviewable by a higher court, if authorized by statute.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-17, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 273.
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